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1. Introduction 
 
Every quarter since 1996, the Bank of England has asked a group of external forecasters for 
their views on some key macroeconomic indicators.  Initially only forecasts of the official 
targeted measure of inflation were requested; subsequently questions about GDP growth, the 
Bank’s official interest rate, and the sterling effective exchange rate index were added.  In 
general there are three questions about each variable, relating to three different forecast 
horizons.  Of particular interest is the collection of expectations of future inflation and GDP 
growth not only as point forecasts but also in the form of subjective probability distributions 
– so-called density forecasts.  The Survey of External Forecasters (henceforth SEF) provides 
useful information on expectations outside the Bank about future economic developments 
and the likely achievement of the Bank’s inflation target, which is supplied to the Bank’s 
Monetary Policy Committee at its quarterly forecast meetings.  The Committee meets 
monthly, and every three months prepares a forecast and the accompanying Inflation Report.  
The quarterly Inflation Report also presents aggregate results from the current SEF. 
 
The Bank of England has recently made available the individual SEF responses, 
suitably anonymised, for research purposes.  This new source of survey data is comparable to 
the well known US Survey of Professional Forecasters, hitherto the only available source of 
time series of density forecasts in macroeconomics.  The context is slightly different, since in 
the UK case the survey proprietor is itself a producer of published forecasts, to which its 
survey makes a useful input, as described below.  Nevertheless the new data offer 
opportunities to replicate and extend some of the studies undertaken on the US data.  Our 
previous articles derive measures of uncertainty and disagreement from the SEF data (Boero, 
Smith and Wallis, 2008a), and analyse the revision process in repeated “fixed-event” 
forecasts of the same outcome (2008b).  The present article provides a first analysis of the 
quality of the individual and aggregate point forecasts of inflation and GDP growth. 
 
The data are described as a three-dimensional panel, following Davies and Lahiri 
(1995), because in addition to the usual two dimensions of a panel data set – individuals and 
time periods – we have multiple forecasts, reported in successive quarterly surveys, of 
particular inflation and GDP growth outcomes.  A further dimension arises from the implicit 
availability of two point forecasts, one the reported point forecast, the other implicit in a 
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measure of location of the reported density forecast.  We consider possible sources of 
differences between these two forecasts, and analyse the performance of both forecasts. 
 
 The remainder of this article is organised as follows.  The structure of the survey and 
its use by the Monetary Policy Committee, together with the properties of the dataset and its 
dual point forecasts, are described in Section 2.  The econometric framework used for 
forecast evaluation is presented in Section 3, and the empirical results follow in the next four 
sections.  Section 4 deals with tests of unbiasedness and summary measures of forecast 
performance, Section 5 explores the possibility of asymmetry in the forecasters’ loss 
functions, Section 6 presents evidence of individual heterogeneity, and Section 7 considers 
tests of forecast efficiency.  Section 8 concludes. 
 
 
2. The structure and use of the Survey of External Forecasters 
 
2.1. Survey design 
The institutions covered in the survey include City firms, academic institutions and private 
consultancies, and are predominantly based in London.  The sample changes from time to 
time as old respondents leave or new survey members are included, and not every institution 
provides a forecast to the Bank every quarter, so the panel is incomplete.  Although the 
survey members are individually anonymous, it is reasonable to assume that, collectively, 
there is considerable overlap with the professional forecasters regularly covered by services 
such as Consensus Economics and HM Treasury’s monthly compilation, Forecasts for the 
UK Economy. 
 
 For the first two years the survey questions related only to inflation, defined with 
respect to the Retail Prices Index excluding mortgage interest payments (RPIX), in terms of 
which the official inflation target was defined; the survey definition switched to the 
Consumer Prices Index (CPI) from the February 2004 survey, following the change in the 
Bank’s official targeted measure in December 2003.  We date the surveys according to the 
date of the Inflation Report in which the aggregate results were published – February, May, 
August, November – although the surveys were completed towards the end of the preceding 
month.  Questions about point and density forecasts of GDP growth have appeared since 
February 1998, and about point forecasts of the official interest rate and the sterling exchange 
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rate index since November 1999: these last two variables are not included in the present 
study, in the absence of density forecasts.  The inflation section of a recent questionnaire is 
shown in Fig. 1; the GDP growth questions have the same format.  Whereas the US Survey of 
Professional Forecasters offers respondents a choice of level or growth rates in reporting their 
point forecasts, which hinders joint interpretation of point and density forecasts, here there is 
no ambiguity.  Also the point forecast question is immediately adjacent to the density 
forecasts, unlike the US survey, and the use of the neutral “central projection” term makes no 
attempt to specify which particular measure of central tendency of the density forecast might 
be related to the respondent’s point forecast. 
 
 Each quarterly survey since February 1998 asks for forecasts at three future points in 
time, as in the example in Fig. 1: the fourth quarter (Q4) of the current year; the fourth 
quarter of the following year; and the corresponding quarter two years ahead.  (In the early 
“inflation-only” surveys, only the first two questions appeared.)  This structure eventually 
delivers nine successive forecasts of a given Q4 outcome, which form a sequence of “fixed-
event” forecasts, with the date of the forecast preceding the date of the outcome by 8, 7,…, 1, 
0 quarters.  Given that the survey goes out early in the quarter, when no data on current-
quarter inflation and GDP growth are available, we treat these as h-step-ahead forecasts with 
horizon h equal to 9, 8,…, 2, 1 quarters successively.  In the more conventional time-series 
framework of constant-horizon forecasts, the third question delivers a quarterly series of 
nine-quarter-ahead forecasts, but the first two questions give only one observation per year at 
intermediate horizons, 4h =  and 8 in February, 3h =  and 7 in May, and so on.  This focus 
on end-year targets is clearly more familiar to forecasters, since there are usually a few 
respondents who answer the first two questions but not the third question.  Despite this, in 
May 2006 all three questions were switched to a constant-horizon format, focusing on the 
corresponding quarter one, two and three years ahead. 
 
2.2. The Monetary Policy Committee’s inflation forecasts 
In an inflation targeting central bank, inflation forecasts are central to the conduct of policy, 
because it takes time for interest rate changes to affect inflation.  “Inflation targeting implies 
inflation forecast targeting” (Svensson, 1997, p.1113; emphasis in original).  In the United 
Kingdom in May 1997, the newly elected Labour Government granted operational 
independence to the Bank of England, through the newly created Monetary Policy Committee 
(MPC), to set interest rates in pursuit of an inflation target set by the Government.  The MPC 
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also assumed responsibility for the inflation forecasts previously produced by the Bank.  
Bean and Jenkinson (2001) describe the internal processes adopted by the MPC, covering the 
monthly policy round, the quarterly forecast round, and the preparation of the accompanying 
Inflation Report.  In particular, at quarterly “draft forecast” meetings a few days before the 
associated MPC policy meeting, to help the MPC’s overall assessment of its own forecast, a 
draft forecast is compared with external forecasts (2001, pp.439-440).  These include the 
SEF, completed a few days earlier.  Summary information from the survey, comprising 
average point forecasts and density forecasts, and the distribution of individual point 
forecasts, is then published in the Inflation Report, which features the MPC’s density 
forecasts of inflation and GDP growth in the form of the famous fan charts. 
 
 An annual examination of the MPC’s forecasting record has appeared in a box in the 
Inflation Report each August since 1999.  For the point forecasts of inflation (density forecast 
means) these give an overall impression of performance that is regarded as satisfactory, with 
forecast errors averaging close to zero and a mean absolute error in one-year-ahead forecasts 
of 0.3 percentage points.  No comparative evaluation has been reported to date, although such 
a study has recently been undertaken by Groen, Kapetanios and Price (2007), who compare 
the MPC’s forecasts to a variety of inflation forecasting models, including linear and non-
linear univariate models, and three- and five-variable VARs.  This is described as a “real 
time” evaluation, because the estimated forecasting models are conditioned on the dataset 
that was available at the time the MPC’s forecasts were prepared.  The results, for horizons 
1h = , 4 and 8, are striking: in no case does a model outperform the MPC forecasts, in terms 
of out-of-sample forecast RMSE.  Groen et al. attribute the relatively poor performance of the 
statistical inflation forecasts to the importance of the judgment exercised by the MPC.  In the 
present context this includes judgment of the weight to be given to external forecasts, and we 
note the result in Section 4.4 below that the SEF average point forecast of inflation in turn 
outperforms the MPC’s forecast, so perhaps judgment could have been further improved.  
Casillas-Olvera and Bessler (2006) compare the published SEF average density forecasts two 
years ahead with those of the MPC, and find that the SEF does a better job than the MPC in 
terms of the Brier score for the inflation forecasts. 
 
2.3. The dataset of individual SEF responses 
The dataset of individual SEF responses made available by the Bank covers 39 surveys, 
beginning with the May 1996 survey and continuing to November 2005.  Each respondent 
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has an identification number, so that their individual responses can be tracked over time and 
their point and density forecasts can be matched.  The total number of respondents appearing 
in the dataset is 48, one of whom stayed for only two years, while only one is ever-present in 
all 39 surveys.  To avoid complications caused by long gaps in the data, and to maintain 
degrees of freedom at a reasonable level, most of our analyses that refer to individual 
forecasters are conducted on a subsample of 19 “regular respondents”.  These are respondents 
who each provided more than 70% of the total possible responses to the inflation and GDP 
growth questions over the available surveys, which number 39 for inflation and 32 for GDP 
growth. 
 
2.4. Comparing point forecasts and density forecast means 
The SEF density forecasts are reported as histograms, with respondents supplying their 
probabilities that future inflation or GDP growth will fall in each of a number of pre-assigned 
intervals, or bins.  The histograms in the SEF data have rather few bins, between four and six, 
with the first and last being open-ended.  A given density forecast implies a point forecast, as 
a measure of location of the distribution, and we consider the mean, estimated by applying 
the standard formula, assuming that the reported probabilities are concentrated at the mid-
points of the respective intervals, and that the open-ended intervals have an assumed finite 
width, equal to twice the width of the interior intervals.  We first describe the nature of the 
differences between the reported point forecasts and the density forecast means, and then 
discuss its implications for the subsequent forecast evaluation exercises. 
 
 Summary evidence is presented in Tables 1 and 2, which report the percentage of 
cases in which the point forecast deviates from the density forecast mean by more than 0.2 
percentage points, first for each regular respondent, then aggregated over this subsample, and 
finally for the full SEF sample.  The two tables deal respectively with the inflation and GDP 
growth forecasts.  The full-sample information is also given by Boero et al. (2008a, Table 1), 
who compare the results to those of Engelberg, Manski and Williams (2008).  These authors 
document the extent to which reported point forecasts in the US Survey of Professional 
Forecasters deviate from calculated measures of location of the reported density forecasts, 
and observe that in such cases, forecasters are inclined to present “favourable” scenarios, in 
the sense that, more often than not, their point forecasts anticipate lower inflation and higher 
output growth than indicated by the measures of location of their density forecasts.  For the 
GDP growth forecasts, this tendency increases as the forecast horizon increases, which is in 
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accordance with the finding in the literature on subjective probability judgments that 
optimism increases with forecast horizon (see Milburn, 1978, for an early discussion and 
experimental evidence). 
 
The full-sample SEF data in Tables 1 and 2 show a greater tendency towards similarly 
“favourable” scenarios in respect of GDP growth than inflation, with this again increasing as 
the forecast horizon (or question number) increases.  However in the two-year-ahead inflation 
forecasts the deviations are more evenly balanced, suggesting that, in an inflation targeting 
regime, a favourable scenario is one in which the official target is achieved in the medium 
term, and this may lead to a positive or negative adjustment to an initial forecast.  The 
aggregate data for the regular respondent subsample show the same patterns, although these 
data mask considerable variation across the 19 individual rows of each table.  We note that 
the interpretation of Engelberg et al. (2008) that “forecasters who skew their point predictions 
tend to present rosy scenarios” implicitly uses the density forecast as the base for the 
comparison, whereas the SPF questionnaire first asks for point forecasts of several variables 
and then, on a separate page, for density forecasts of inflation and GDP growth.  The SEF 
question shown in Fig. 1 gives less priority to one forecast or the other, and differences in 
forecasters’ loss functions provide an alternative interpretation of the individual divergences 
summarised in Tables 1 and 2. 
 
 The optimal point forecast under the conventional quadratic loss function is the mean 
of the density forecast, but is different from the mean under other symmetric loss functions if 
the density is asymmetric.  For a symmetric linear loss function the optimal point forecast is 
the median, and for a bounded “all or nothing” loss function the optimal point forecast is the 
mode of the density forecast.  And if the loss function is asymmetric, again the optimal point 
forecast differs from the density forecast mean. 
 
Regression tests of the divergences between the reported point forecast and the 
density forecast mean find a highly significant negative coefficient on the skewness of the 
forecast density in the pooled subsample and in many individual cases, for both inflation and 
GDP growth.  This holds in regressions with the point forecast as dependent variable, 
including the density forecast mean as a regressor, or with the divergence between them as 
dependent variable, or in an ordered probit regression based on the classification of the 
divergence used in Tables 1 and 2.  Recalling that positive skewness implies 
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mean>median>mode, this result is consistent with forecasters reporting a point forecast 
closer to one that is optimal under some other loss function than the standard quadratic loss 
function, such as the two examples given above.  The individual cases in which a significant 
negative skewness coefficient does not appear are those in which relatively few divergences 
greater than 0.2±  are observed, including individuals with several zero entries in Tables 1 
and 2.  These differences across individuals are suggestive of differences in their loss 
functions.  This heterogeneity merits further investigation in its own right, and also suggests 
that forecast evaluation should be conducted not only in the standard framework, which is 
founded on squared error loss, but also in the framework proposed by Elliott, Komunjer and 
Timmermann (2005), which allows more general loss functions.  They find that allowing for 
asymmetric loss can significantly change the outcome of empirical tests of forecast 
rationality, and some of their procedures are included below. 
 
 
3. The econometric framework 
 
We adopt the notational convention of the three-dimensional panel introduced by Davies and 
Lahiri (1995), and denote as ithF  the h-step-ahead forecast of the outcome at time t made by 
individual i.  Thus the data are sorted first by individual, 1,...,i N= , with 19N =  in our 
regular respondents subsample, then by target period 1,...,t T= , and finally by horizon, with 
the earliest, longest-horizon forecast listed first.  If t refers to the first, second or third quarter 
of a year then there is only one forecast, with horizon 9h H= = , whereas if t refers to a 
fourth quarter then we have nine forecasts, with , 1,...,1h H H= −  (except in the initial years).  
With these definitions and the time series structure described in Section 2.1, the forecast ithF  
is based on an information set dated t h− , denoted t hI − , and the forecast is elicited by the 
survey carried out in quarter 1t h− + .   
 
 With the actual outcome for the variable of interest denoted tA , Davies and Lahiri 
(1995) decompose the forecast error A F−  as 
  t ith i th ithA F φ λ ε− = + + .        (1) 
The second component thλ  is common to all individual forecast errors – it has no i subscript 
– and it represents the cumulative effect on tA  of uncorrelated period-by-period aggregate 
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shocks since the forecast was made.  The first and third components of the forecast error are 
specific to individual forecasters, separating a possible systematic effect or individual bias iφ  
from an idiosyncratic non-autocorrelated error, ithε , which might reflect individual sentiment 
or “animal spirits”, and mishandling of or inadequacies in the initial information set.  The 
extension by Davies (2006) relaxes the assumption that the individual forecaster’s bias iφ  is 
independent of the forecast horizon h, so the decomposition becomes 
  t ith ih th ithA F φ λ ε− = + + .        (2) 
 
 General expressions for estimates of the forecast error components in equation (1) are 
  ( )
1 1
1ˆ
T H
i t ith
t h
A F
TH
φ
= =
= −∑∑ ,        (3) 
  ( )
1
1ˆ ˆ
N
th t ith i
i
A F
N
λ φ
=
= − −∑ ,        (4) 
  ˆ ˆiˆth t ith i thA Fε φ λ= − − − .        (5) 
In the extended decomposition of equation (2), estimates of the horizon-specific individual 
biases are 
  ( )
1
1ˆ ,    1,...,
T
ih t ith
t
A F h H
T
φ
=
= − =∑ .       (6) 
If the number of point forecast errors were the same for all horizons, as is implicit in the 
above definition, then equation (3) would give 
  
1
1ˆ ˆ
H
i ih
hH
φ φ
=
= ∑ . 
This does not hold in the SEF dataset by virtue of the structure of the questions, irrespective 
of additional complications caused by missing observations.  To represent the SEF structure 
described above we distinguish between the quarters, 1,..., 4q = , by writing the time index as 
4( 1)t y q= − + , where 1,...,y Y=  indicates the year, so that the specific form of equation (3) 
is 
  ( ) ( )3 94( 1) ,4( 1) ,9 4 ,4 ,
1 1 1
1 1 1ˆ
3 9
Y
i y q i y q y i y h
y q h
A F A F
Y
φ − + − +
= = =
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟= − + −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
∑ ∑ ∑ ,            (3 )′  
with a corresponding specialisation of equation (6). 
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 Tests of unbiasedness and efficiency of forecasts under squared error loss can be 
based on regressions of observed forecast errors on various regressors.  The simplest is the 
test of the null hypothesis of zero mean forecast error, or unbiasedness of individual 
forecasts, and the estimate iˆφ  in equation (3) is equal to the coefficient in a regression of the 
forecast error on an intercept term.  Tests of efficiency or rationality check for the absence of 
a correlation between the forecast error and information available at time t h−  by regressing 
the error on candidate variables from this information set, which may include previous 
forecast errors. 
 
The regression context is convenient for considering questions of inference, in 
particular the calculation of the relevant forecast error covariance matrix, denoted Σ , and 
associated regression coefficient covariance matrices, given as ( ) ( )1 1X X X X X XΣ− −′ ′ ′  in the 
usual least squares regression notation.  Davies and Lahiri (1995, §2.2, 2.3) consider the 
covariance between two typical forecast errors 
  ( ) ( )1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2cov ,  cov ,  t i t h t i t h t h i t h t h i t hA F A F λ ε λ ε− − = + + . 
They develop expressions for the NTH NTH×  covariance matrix Σ  and its estimation, with 
an extension (1995, §5) to accommodate observed heteroskedasticity.  These can be readily 
adapted to the structure of the SEF described above.  Missing data are handled by 
appropriately compressing the data and covariance matrices (Davies and Lahiri, 1995, p.213). 
 
 
4. Unbiasedness tests and forecast RMSEs 
 
4.1. Point forecasts 
Analyses of each regular respondent’s point forecast errors are summarised in Tables 3 and 4.  
Table 3 contains results for inflation, using the appropriate definition of the target variable, 
namely the Retail Prices Index excluding mortgage interest payments (RPIX) for the surveys 
up to November 2003, and the Consumer Prices Index (CPI) from the February 2004 survey.  
These series are never revised after first publication.  Table 4 contains results for GDP 
growth, first using real-time data as actual outcome data to define the forecast errors, and 
then replacing these by revised (“historical”) data, as of the August 2007 issue of Economic 
Trends.  In all cases the outcome data extend to 2005Q4, so the summary statistics in the two 
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panels of Table 4 include the contribution of very recent forecast errors which are defined 
with respect to outcome data which are, as yet, relatively similar.  The maximum possible 
number of inflation forecasts is 98, supplied by only one forecaster, as noted above, and of 
GDP growth forecasts is 84. 
 
Columns 2-6 of the tables report the root mean squared forecast error (RMSE), the 
variance 2ˆ
iεσ  of the idiosyncratic errors estimated as in equation (5), the individual bias iˆφ  
given in equation (3), its standard error calculated from the appropriate covariance matrix, 
and the resulting t-ratio.  The significance of the t-test of the null hypothesis of zero 
individual bias at the 10, 5 or 1 percent level is indicated by one, two or three asterisks 
respectively. 
 
Inflation   The mean forecast error is negative for 13 of the 19 regular respondents, indicating 
a general tendency to overpredict inflation.  The mean error is significantly different from 
zero at the 5 per cent level in two cases, both being cases of a significant negative bias.  The 
larger of these, and the largest absolute bias overall, is approximately a quarter of one 
percentage point.  Although this is statistically significant, in practical terms it is small, 
compared to the average outcome of 2.5% for RPIX inflation (which is exactly equal to the 
target value) and the deviation of 1±  percentage point from target that triggers the 
requirement of a public explanation by the Governor of the Bank of England.  (The range of 
the quarterly observations of the annual RPIX inflation rate is 1.9–3.2%.) 
 
GDP growth   The upper panel of Table 4 is based on GDP growth forecast errors defined 
with reference to real-time data on the actual outcomes.  These show a more pronounced 
tendency towards overprediction than the inflation forecast errors, with negative mean 
forecast errors for all but two of the regular respondents, but no mean error is significantly 
different from zero.  However the picture changes when the evaluation is based on revised 
GDP data, as shown in the lower panel of the table.  The general effect of revisions to the 
national accounts over this period has been to increase the preliminary estimates of GDP 
growth, and the magnitude of the revisions is sufficient to turn all the negative mean errors in 
the upper panel into positive mean errors in the lower panel.  Although none of these is 
significantly different from zero at the 5% level, the increase in the mean error of individual 
10 from the small positive number in the upper panel is sufficient to make it significantly 
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different from zero at the 10% level in the lower panel.  As noted above, revisions to recent 
data are not yet complete, nevertheless, over the full sample period, the average upward 
revision in quarterly observations on the annual GDP growth rate is 0.57 percentage points.  
(The range of the observations is 0.75–3.7% in the real-time data and 1.6–4.4% in the revised 
data.)  The relative difficulty of tracking the revised data is indicated by the increase in 
absolute value of the mean errors from the upper to the lower panel, and the associated 
increase in RMSE. 
 
 The general difficulty of forecast construction and evaluation in the face of data 
revisions is well appreciated in the forecasting literature (for a recent survey see Croushore, 
2006).  The specific difficulties facing the Monetary Policy Committee with respect to recent 
revisions in UK GDP data are highlighted in two boxes in the August 2005 issue of the Bank 
of England Inflation Report.  If it is thought that the revised data are closer to the truth, and 
that they should be the forecaster’s objective, then the difficulty is in deciding where to start, 
since the current initial conditions will be subject to revision.  This led the MPC to widen 
substantially the uncertainty bands around the current-quarter and next-quarter forecasts of 
GDP growth from August 2005, and to publish backcasts and nowcasts of GDP growth, with 
uncertainty bands, from August 2007. 
 
4.2. Density forecast means 
Corresponding analyses of the errors in the density forecast means give similar results to 
those presented for the reported point forecasts in Tables 3 and 4, and do not merit the 
inclusion of an additional pair of tables.  For inflation, the mean forecast error is negative for 
all but two of the 19 individual forecasters, although only one of these is now larger than −0.2 
and significant at the 5% level.  There are increases in RMSE as often as decreases between 
the two forecasts, although there is a slight decrease in the overall level, mostly as a result of 
the two forecasters with the largest RMSE values in Table 3 – individuals 1 and 12 – showing 
rather smaller RMSEs of their density forecast means.  For GDP growth, we observe the 
same effects as above on comparing evaluations against real-time data with those using 
revised data, namely an increase in mean errors such that they are all positive in the latter 
case, and associated increases in RMSE.  Once more, however, no mean error is significantly 
different from zero at the 5% level. 
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4.3. Horizon-specific individual biases 
Although the preceding analyses show no forecast biases that merit further investigation, the 
assumption that the individual forecaster’s bias, iφ  in equation (1), is independent of the 
forecast horizon h may be unduly restrictive.  We relax this assumption by considering the 
extended error decomposition in equation (2), and estimating horizon-specific individual 
biases.  For each regular respondent we calculate iˆhφ  as in equation (6), and consider tests of 
their individual significance and tests of their equality over h. 
 
For the inflation point forecast errors, we reject the null hypothesis of equality of 
forecast bias over horizon at the 5% level for four of our 19 regular respondents.  These four 
all have two or three horizon-specific iˆhφ  coefficients significantly different from zero at this 
level, although for three of them the overall bias shown in Table 3 is not significant; the 
fourth case is individual 7.  Individual 12 is a counterexample, with a significant overall bias, 
resulting from several significant biases at different horizons, and non-rejection of the null 
hypothesis of equality across horizons. 
 
 The GDP growth real-time data forecast errors show two individuals whose 
insignificant overall bias masks variation with horizon that is significant at the 5% level.  But 
overall there are only two horizon-specific individual iˆhφ  coefficients significantly different 
from zero.  Substantially different results are obtained with the revised outcome data.  Again 
there are only two individuals with significant variation across horizon, but 17 out of 19 
individuals have two or three significant iˆhφ  coefficients, all of which relate to short horizons.  
Once more these findings are masked by the absence of significant overall biases in Table 4, 
but they represent a further manifestation of the difficulties discussed above.  The impact of 
data revisions on forecast performance is greatest at short horizons because it is here that 
accurate initial conditions are of greatest importance; at longer horizons forecasts tend to 
return to trend. 
 
 A similar pattern of results is found for the density forecast means, for both variables. 
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4.4. The SEF average and the MPC’s forecasts 
By way of a summary, akin to the study by Casillas-Olvera and Bessler (2006), Table 5 
presents comparable results for the average forecasts across all survey respondents and the 
forecasts of the Monetary Policy Committee.  Each quarterly Inflation Report presents the 
average point forecasts from the current Survey of External Forecasters and, with rather fuller 
discussion, the MPC’s current forecasts.  The latter cover all intermediate future quarters up 
to the forecast horizon, and we extract from the Bank’s forecast spreadsheets the fan chart 
means that correspond to the three survey questions.  It is seen that in all cases the forecasts 
are unbiased. 
 
Comparisons of RMSE for forecasts of GDP growth show little difference between 
the SEF average and MPC forecasts, whether real-time or revised data are used as actual 
outcome data.  Again we have a clear indication of the increased difficulty of forecasting the 
revised GDP growth data, as discussed above.  For the inflation forecasts, which receive 
greater attention in an inflation targeting context, the RMSE comparison clearly favours the 
SEF average forecast, as noted in Section 2.2 above.  It is also notable that the SEF average 
forecast RMSE is smaller than any individual regular respondent’s RMSE shown in Table 3.  
Although the 19 regular respondents do not always enter the published survey average, which 
also includes other less regular respondents, this result supports the familiar advantage to be 
gained by forecast pooling.  The same result does not hold for the GDP growth forecasts, 
Table 4 showing a few individual RMSEs smaller than that of the SEF average forecast in 
each case, again suggesting ambiguity over the forecasters’ target measure. 
 
 
5. Asymmetries in forecasters’ loss functions 
 
We return to the question raised at the end of Section 2 with the evidence of the point forecast 
errors analysed above, in the context of the generalised loss function proposed by Elliott et al. 
(2005), which is 
  [ ]( , ) (1 2 ) ( 0) pL p A F A Fα α α= + − × − < −1     (7) 
for integer p and 0 1α≤ ≤ .  With 0.5α =  this gives the familiar symmetric linear and 
quadratic loss functions for 1,2p =  respectively, while their asymmetric counterparts are 
obtained if 0.5α ≠ .  For given p, Elliott et al. develop estimators of α  and tests of forecast 
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rationality under asymmetric loss.  When analysing mean forecast errors, an estimate ˆ 0.5α ≠  
“can be interpreted as justifying biased forecasts by adjusting the loss function to make them 
optimal”, as they say (2005, p.1113).  Given the ambiguity in the definition of GDP growth 
forecast errors, with respect to real-time or revised data, we study only the inflation forecasts. 
 
 Estimates of α  are presented in Table 6, first relaxing the symmetry assumption of 
the quadratic loss function implicit in the foregoing analysis, then also moving to an 
asymmetric linear loss function.  Estimated coefficients that lead to rejection of the null 
hypothesis that 0.5α =  are indicated by asterisks, as above.  Relevant expressions for the 
standard error of the estimated coefficient are given by Elliott et al., and we implement them 
under the null for the purpose of constructing an appropriate t-statistic. 
 
 Maintaining a quadratic function, it is seen that there are five significant departures 
from symmetry, all with ˆ 0.5α > .  These individuals have the five largest absolute biases in 
Table 3, the biases all being negative.  A value of α  in excess of 0.5 implies that positive 
forecast errors incur greater loss than equivalent negative forecast errors, that is, there is a 
greater fear of underprediction than overprediction, hence the tendency to overpredict 
demonstrated by these individuals may be loss-minimising.  In the face of general 
underestimation of the amplitude of peaks and troughs found in the literature, these 
forecasters are anxious not to miss a peak in inflation, but are less concerned about missing a 
trough. 
 
 Under a linear specification, it is immediately noticeable that smaller values of αˆ  are 
obtained.  The reduction is such that, of the five individuals significantly above 0.5 in the 
quadratic case, only one remains significantly so under linearity.  At the same time six 
individuals have values of αˆ  in the range 0.34–0.39, all significantly different from 0.5.  It is 
difficult to relate these results to the calculations reported in Table 3, which rest on the 
standard squared error loss framework, and further investigation through other means seems 
warranted.  The calculations reported in this section can be relatively sensitive to outliers, but 
the main case in which these are evident is that of individual 1, discussed below, who is not 
of major concern in this section. 
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6. Individual heterogeneity 
 
The good performance of the SEF average forecast shown in Table 5 and the general 
unbiasedness of the regular respondents’ individual forecasts masks considerable variation in 
their forecast performance.  As seen in Table 3, the RMSE of inflation point forecasts ranges 
from 0.30 to 0.57, while the corresponding ranges for GDP growth forecasts (Table 4) are 
0.56 to 0.95 if forecast errors are defined with reference to real-time outcome data, and 0.84 
to 1.19 if revised outcome data are used.  On closer inspection the maximum inflation RMSE 
of 0.57 for individual 1 is heavily influenced by a small number of early longer-horizon 
forecasts of inflation in excess of 4%, which turned out to be much too high.  This pessimism 
occurred prior to the establishment of the policy of inflation targeting by an independent 
central bank in mid-1977 and the establishment of its credibility among these forecasters as 
documented in our previous article (2008a).  This overestimation of inflation was not 
sustained long enough to cause a significant bias, but shows up in this individual’s maximum 
idiosyncratic variance.  The decomposition in equation (1) identifies three components of the 
forecast error and hence of its root mean square, and we undertake more systematic 
comparisons across the two components that are specific to individual forecasters.  Results 
are presented for mean and variance effects, respectively individual biases and idiosyncratic 
error variances, in turn. 
 
 Individual heterogeneity with respect to mean forecast errors is assessed by testing the 
equality of 1 19ˆ ˆ,...,φ φ  as shown in the relevant columns of Table 3 and the upper and lower 
panels of Table 4.  The corresponding test statistics are 1.60, 0.55 and 0.32, respectively.  The 
total number of forecasts entering the calculation is 1561n =  for inflation and 1322n =  for 
GDP growth, and the 5% critical value of the (18, )F n  distribution is 1.61.  Thus the null 
hypothesis of equal mean forecast errors, or individual homogeneity in this respect, is not 
rejected, although the inflation forecast mean errors are very close to rejection at this level. 
 
A test of individual heterogeneity with respect to variance is based on the variance of 
the idiosyncratic error ithε  defined in equation (1): the null hypothesis is that the variances 
2
iεσ  are equal across individuals.  From the estimates reported in Table 3 and the two panels 
of Table 4, we obtain test statistics of 5.96, 5.05 and 4.46, respectively.  Comparison with the 
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1% critical value of (18, )F n  of 1.95 indicates highly significant individual heterogeneity 
with respect to forecast error variance for both variables. 
 
Overwhelming rejections of individual homogeneity are reported by Davies and 
Lahiri (1999) for inflation forecasts in the US Survey of Professional Forecasters, the survey 
dataset that is most comparable to the SEF.  Their individual analyses are based on the 
performance of 45 forecasters who responded more than 50% of the time, supplying forecasts 
one-to-four quarters ahead for up to 89 target dates (1969Q4-1991Q4).  Individual biases are 
much more prevalent than in our sample, with 12 of the 45 forecasters having mean errors 
significantly different from zero at the 5% level (or higher), whether preliminary or revised 
outcome data are used, and whether one quarter horizon forecasts or all forecasts together are 
considered.  Individual homogeneity with respect to idiosyncratic error variance is strongly 
rejected.  However their sample period is one of considerably different inflationary 
experience than ours, including as it does the “Great Inflation” of the 1970s, when there were 
well-documented forecast failures (McNees, 1979).  The significant individual biases are all 
cases of positive mean errors, that is, underpredictions of inflation.  In contrast, RPIX 
inflation during our sample period was in the range 1.9-3.3%, as noted above.  Nevertheless, 
the common finding of individual heterogeneity with respect to idiosyncratic error variance 
indicates that some respondents in both survey samples are better at forecasting than others. 
 
 
7. Tests of efficiency 
 
The rational expectation or efficient forecast of the outcome tA  under squared error loss is its 
expected value conditional on information available at time t h− , hence the null hypothesis 
of forecast efficiency is written 
  ( )ith t t hF E A I −= , 
assuming that t hI −  contains “all available” information.  Standard tests of forecast efficiency 
then check the orthogonality of the forecast errors to variables which the researcher considers 
to be likely members of the forecast information set.  If a variable is found which is 
correlated with the forecast error, and could thus have improved the forecast, then the 
rejection of the null hypothesis is conclusive.  On the other hand, failure to reject efficiency 
may simply reflect the researcher’s failure to find the information that the forecaster had 
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overlooked.  Since the information set includes past A, F and A F− , a simple test that is 
often used is to check the absence of autocorrelation of order h or more in the forecast errors.  
Given the relative preponderance of forecasts at 9h =  in the SEF dataset and the low power 
of high-order autocorrelation tests, together with the double loss of degrees of freedom for 
autocorrelation coefficients caused by missing observations, we do not pursue this possibility. 
 
 To test the efficiency of the inflation forecasts, we consider four variables that are 
likely members of the information set: the latest available inflation outcome at the time the 
survey was carried out, the most recent forecast by the MPC, the most recent SEF average 
forecast, and the real-time output gap or inflationary pressure measure of Garratt, Lee, Mise 
and Shields (2007).  (We use the published average SEF forecast rather than the individual’s 
own previous forecast because, again, missing observations cause a double loss of degrees of 
freedom.)  We first test the admissibility of this instrument set in a multiple regression of the 
forecast on the four candidate variables.  This gives significant regression results at the 5% 
level or (mostly) higher for 15 of the 19 regular respondents, from which we conclude that 
these variables are valid candidate variables for testing efficiency.  Proceeding to a regression 
of the forecast errors on these variables, we find a significant regression result and hence a 
rejection of efficiency in three cases, namely individuals 1, 7 and 12, while 16 of the 19 
regular respondents pass this test. 
 
 For the GDP growth forecasts, the longer publication delay in national accounts data 
implies that the latest observation on the outcome that can be included in t hI −  is 1t hA − − , not 
t hA − .  In these circumstances we also include the monthly GDP estimate produced by the 
National Institute of Economic and Social Research as a candidate variable (Mitchell, Smith, 
Weale, Wright and Salazar, 2005), together with the most recent MPC and SEF average 
forecasts, as in the case of inflation.  The multiple regression of the forecast on these four 
candidate variables gives a significant regression result for 10 out of 19 individuals, which is 
less strong evidence in favour of these instruments than in the case of inflation, perhaps 
reflecting greater difficulties caused by data delays and the forecasters’ treatment of potential 
revisions.  Nevertheless, on turning to efficiency tests we find overwhelming evidence 
against the null hypothesis, with rejections for 16 individuals if errors are defined with 
respect to real-time data, and for all but one individual if errors are defined with respect to 
revised data.  Among the candidate variables, the most recent MPC forecast has a strong 
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positive correlation with many individual forecasts, and a strong negative correlation with the 
forecast error, leading to the rejection of efficiency; the MPC’s own forecast fails this test.  
This suggests that among individual respondents there is, unfortunately, too great a tendency 
to “follow my leader” in this respect.  This is not a feature of the inflation forecasts. 
 
 
8. Conclusion 
 
This article provides a first evaluation of the forecasts of inflation and GDP growth obtained 
from the Bank of England’s Survey of External Forecasters, considering both the survey 
average forecasts published in the quarterly Inflation Report, and the individual survey 
responses, recently made available by the Bank.  The survey was initiated by the Bank in 
1996 to provide independent input to its own inflation forecast processes, which became the 
responsibility of the Monetary Policy Committee following its establishment in 1997.  The 
published SEF average forecasts of inflation are seen to have outperformed the MPC’s 
forecasts: in this respect the pacemaker is winning the race. 
 
Access to the individual survey responses allows replication of the point forecast 
evaluations performed on several similar survey datasets by several authors.  A distinguishing 
feature of the SEF, however, is that it also collects subjective probability assessments or 
density forecasts, in which respect its only existing counterpart is the long-established Survey 
of Professional Forecasters in the United States.  This allows a dual evaluation, of the 
reported point forecasts and the alternative point forecasts implied by a measure of location 
of the density forecasts.  As with the US data, differences between the two forecasts in the 
SEF can be interpreted as a tendency towards reporting point forecasts that represent 
“favourable” or optimistic outcomes, although an alternative interpretation of forecasters’ 
behaviour in terms of asymmetric loss functions is preferred. 
 
 In tests of unbiasedness of the inflation and GDP growth forecasts, both the survey 
average and a subsample of individual forecasters present an overall picture of good 
performance.  As is often remarked in discussions of the performance of the Monetary Policy 
Committee over its first ten years, however, this was a relatively calm period for the UK 
economy that presented no serious problems to forecasters, in the form of major turning 
points, for example.  Behind the general picture lies considerable individual heterogeneity, 
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shown not only by the failure of standard tests of equality of idiosyncratic error variances, but 
also by further evidence of different degrees of asymmetry in forecasters’ loss functions.  In 
the face of this individual heterogeneity, the good performance of the survey average 
forecasts of inflation is another example of the benefits of forecast pooling. 
 
The inflation forecasts also perform well in tests of efficiency, whereas the GDP 
growth forecasts do not.  This finding may be related to the familiar difficulty of 
measurement, with inaccurate real-time national accounts data and their subsequent extended 
revision process causing difficulties for forecast construction and evaluation.  Data revisions 
substantially change the overall impression of the performance of forecasts of GDP growth at 
short horizons, as is also the experience of the Monetary Policy Committee. 
 
 Many questions remain to be explored in the context of the SEF dataset, replicating 
and extending an already large empirical literature on forecasting.  Several of our findings 
prompt questions about the individual forecasters’ methods and objectives, whose exploration 
would be worthwhile. 
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Table 1.   Divergences between point forecasts and density forecast means: inflation 
 
 Percentage of cases (across all available time periods) in which the point forecast 
 lies above (below) the density forecast mean by more than 0.2 percentage points 
 
 
 Question 1 Question 2 Question 3 
    
Individual  above  below above below above  below  
1 5.1 20.5 43.6 17.9 37.5 15.6 
2 10.5 10.5 7.9 23.7 19.4 6.5 
3 13.5 24.3 18.9 27.0 3.3 23.3 
4 8.3 13.9 11.1 27.8 10.3 17.2 
5 2.8 8.3 16.7 5.6 11.5 0 
11.1 11.1 19.4 5.6 17.6 11.8 6 
7 8.6 5.7 2.9 14.3 3.6 17.9 
8 11.4 5.7 8.6 20.0 0 3.4 
9 2.9 26.5 23.5 23.5 11.5 30.8 
10 0 20.6 2.9 14.7 12.5 0 
11 0 3.0 0 3.0 0 0 
12 0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.8 0 
40.6 9.4 12.5 6.3 6.7 6.7 13 
14 6.3 0 15.6 3.1 12.5 3.1 
15 6.7 3.3 0 13.3 0 0 
16 0 20.0 3.3 30.0 4.0 16.0 
17 6.9 20.7 17.2 24.1 7.7 26.9 
18 3.4 0 0 13.8 4.5 0 
19 0 3.7 0 0 4.5 4.5 
    
Subsample 8.2 12.4 12.1 15.9 10.5 12.2 
    
Full sample 6.2 11.5 10.2 14.1 9.4 9.8 
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Table 2.   Divergences between point forecasts and density forecast means: GDP growth 
 
 Percentage of cases (across all available time periods) in which the point forecast 
 lies above (below) the density forecast mean by more than 0.2 percentage points 
 
 
 Question 1 Question 2 Question 3 
    
Individual above below above below above below 
    
1 40.6 6.3 40.6 15.6 34.4 3.1 
2 29.0 9.7 54.8 12.9 50.0 0 
3 60.0 16.7 76.7 6.7 76.7 0 
4 17.2 13.8 31.0 10.3 67.9 0 
5 13.8 6.9 24.1 3.4 23.1 11.5 
6 31.0 13.8 55.2 0 68.8 12.5 
7 39.3 10.7 57.1 7.1 48.1 3.7 
8 25.9 3.7 50.0 7.7 45.5 0 
9 29.6 33.3 29.6 22.2 23.1 26.9 
10 21.4 25.0 39.3 21.4 42.9 7.1 
11 11.5 0 7.7 0 14.3 0 
12 15.4 7.7 11.5 0 12.0 0 
13 36.7 6.7 73.3 3.3 63.3 6.7 
14 18.8 9.4 25.0 0 15.6 18.8 
15 23.1 11.5 57.7 3.8 62.5 0 
16 33.3 8.3 54.2 8.3 32.0 12.0 
17 20.0 4.0 32.0 8.0 11.5 11.5 
18 18.2 0 68.2 0 63.6 0 
19 4.5 4.5 9.1 0 22.7 0 
    
Subsample 27.9 10.5 44.8 8.0 43.0 6.7 
    
Full sample 27.4 8.8 44.2 6.6 46.6 4.6 
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Table 3.   Analysis of inflation point forecast errors 
 
Individual RMSE 
2ˆ
iεσ  iˆφ  SE t-ratio 
    
1 0.570 0.244 −0.047 0.120 -0.390  
2 0.400 0.065 −0.013 0.112 -0.118  
3 0.359 0.044 −0.001 0.110 -0.013  
4 0.386 0.107 0.026 0.113 0.226  
5 0.416 0.069 −0.101 0.111 -0.908  
6 0.314 0.048 −0.074 0.111 -0.665  
7 0.424 0.071 −0.221 0.111 -1.991 ** 
8 0.302 0.020 −0.086 0.123 -0.698  
9 0.350 0.074 0.024 0.121 0.198  
10 0.529 0.243 0.043 0.120 0.360  
11 0.409 0.086 0.034 0.111 0.310  
12 0.535 0.081 −0.269 0.111 -2.428 ** 
13 0.343 0.029 0.056 0.113 0.495  
14 0.407 0.061 0.053 0.116 0.459  
15 0.328 0.029 −0.021 0.106 -0.195  
16 0.302 0.029 −0.030 0.116 -0.256  
17 0.358 0.063 −0.017 0.106 -0.165  
18 0.461 0.082 −0.026 0.123 -0.216  
19 0.331 0.040 −0.002 0.112 -0.022  
    
 
Note to Tables 3-6: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates 
significance at the 5% level, and * indicates significance at the 10% level. 
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Table 4.   Analysis of GDP growth point forecast errors 
 
Individual RMSE 
2ˆ
iεσ  iˆφ  SE    t-ratio 
    
Errors calculated from real-time GDP data  
    
1 0.678 0.260 −0.112 0.229 -0.490  
2 0.587 0.064 −0.083 0.222 -0.376  
3 0.715 0.101 −0.196 0.223 -0.877  
4 0.721 0.164 0.062 0.223 0.276  
5 0.948 0.309 −0.154 0.217 -0.707  
6 0.562 0.201 −0.188 0.223 -0.844  
7 0.872 0.159 −0.097 0.224 -0.434  
8 0.730 0.099 −0.225 0.224 -1.003  
9 0.796 0.391 −0.129 0.233 -0.555  
10 0.841 0.343 0.168 0.233 0.720  
11 0.668 0.114 −0.289 0.221 -1.309  
12 0.873 0.191 −0.275 0.221 -1.246  
13 0.671 0.100 −0.239 0.234 -1.020  
14 0.747 0.132 −0.153 0.228 -0.673  
15 0.708 0.111 −0.036 0.213 -0.170  
16 0.723 0.090 −0.054 0.242 -0.224  
17 0.749 0.151 −0.072 0.216 -0.334  
18 0.708 0.147 −0.082 0.238 -0.342  
19 0.848 0.185 −0.010 0.222 -0.044  
    
Errors calculated from revised GDP data  
    
1 0.964 0.287 0.326 0.335 0.971  
2 0.925 0.070 0.353 0.329 1.072  
3 0.959 0.108 0.235 0.332 0.710  
4 1.019 0.150 0.506 0.328 1.542  
5 1.192 0.252 0.302 0.314 0.960  
6 0.913 0.117 0.254 0.329 0.773  
7 1.133 0.170 0.368 0.330 1.114  
8 0.993 0.117 0.213 0.332 0.639  
9 0.899 0.354 0.287 0.337 0.852  
10 1.150 0.367 0.561 0.339 1.653 * 
11 0.898 0.124 0.133 0.324 0.412  
12 1.055 0.179 0.202 0.322 0.629  
13 0.837 0.145 0.106 0.348 0.304  
14 1.074 0.145 0.302 0.338 0.892  
15 1.043 0.118 0.433 0.309 1.402  
16 1.056 0.104 0.416 0.360 1.158  
17 1.071 0.171 0.333 0.313 1.067  
18 1.081 0.155 0.437 0.349 1.253  
19 1.151 0.187 0.444 0.324 1.371  
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Table 5.   Comparison of SEF average and MPC forecasts 
 
 No. errors RMSE Mean SE t-ratio 
      
 Inflation 
      
SEF average 98 0.286 −0.057 0.110 -0.518 
MPC 98 0.368 0.005 0.109 0.046 
   
 GDP growth (real-time data) 
      
SEF average     84 0.611 −0.079 0.222 -0.354 
MPC 84 0.634 −0.139 0.225 -0.617 
      
 GDP growth (revised data) 
      
SEF average     84 0.947 0.359 0.333 1.077 
MPC 84 0.911 0.299 0.334 0.895 
  
 
 
 
 
Table 6.   Asymmetry parameter estimates: inflation 
 
Individual Quadratic Linear 
     
1 0.56  0.50  
2 0.52  0.49  
3 0.50  0.50  
4 0.46  0.43  
5 0.65 ** 0.53  
6 0.64 ** 0.54  
7 0.82 *** 0.69 *** 
8 0.67 *** 0.49  
9 0.46  0.39 ** 
10 0.45  0.35 *** 
11 0.45  0.36 ** 
12 0.82 *** 0.58  
13 0.40  0.35 *** 
14 0.42  0.39 ** 
15 0.54  0.49  
16 0.56  0.47  
17 0.53  0.43  
18 0.54  0.46  
19 0.51  0.34 *** 
     
 
 Figure 1.  Bank of England questionnaire, May 2005 survey, inflation question 
 
YOUR COMPANY NAME (please complete): _______________________________________ 
 
PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION OF 12-MONTH CPI INFLATION OVER THE MEDIUM TERM 
 
Please indicate the percentage probabilities you would attach to the various possible outcomes in 2005 Q4, 2006 Q4 and 
2007 Q2.  The probabilities of these alternative forecasts should of course add up to 100, as indicated. 
 
PROBABILITY OF 12-MONTH CPI INFLATION FALLING IN THE FOLLOWING RANGES 
 2005 Q4 2006 Q4 2007 Q2 
<1.0%    
1.0% to 1.5%     
1.5% to 2.0%     
2.0% to 2.5%     
2.5% to 3.0%     
≥ 3.0%    
TOTAL 100% 100% 100% 
 
CENTRAL PROJECTION FOR 12-MONTH CPI INFLATION 
2005 Q4 2006 Q4 2007 Q2 
   
 
